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Note
Suing the Aiders and Abettors of Torture: Reviving the
Torture Victim Protection Act
Ryan Plasencia*
INTRODUCTION
Despite the practice’s widespread and unambiguous international condemnation, Amnesty International estimates that at least
eighty-one states currently utilize torture.1 State governments perpetrate these regimes of violence and terror, using a culture of fear to
establish some strategic advantage or achieve some desired end.2 In a
large number of cases, however, an outside entity—a political party,
multinational corporation, or other organization—is benefiting from
or even helping to facilitate the government’s horrific acts.3 This Note
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Minnesota Law School. Special thanks to
Professor Maria Ponomarenko and the MLR Note and Comment Department for their
consistently excellent feedback on iterations of this Note. Thank you to Steve, Theresa,
and Alex, as well as Bunch and Robbie, for their unending support. Finally, thank you
to Maddie for her incredible patience. Copyright © 2021 by Ryan Plasencia.
1. Torture, CTR. FOR JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY, https://cja.org/human-rights
-issues/torture [https://perma.cc/NL88-QHYH] (“Despite the clear prohibitions
against torture, Amnesty International estimates that at least 81 countries currently
practice torture.” (citing Amnesty International)); see Torture, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(2012), https://www.hrw.org/topic/torture [https://perma.cc/XFF4-JT4L] (“The
prohibition against torture is a bedrock principle of international law. Torture . . . is
banned at all times, in all places, including in times of war. No national emergency,
however dire, ever justifies its use.”).
2. See Torture, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/
torture [https://perma.cc/36QQ-6AT6].
3. See, e.g., Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 580 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Plaintiffs
allege that the AUC, acting at the behest and on behalf of [Drummond Company], committed a series of international law violations, including extrajudicial killings, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity, against Plaintiffs’ family members in Colombia.”); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2010) (alleging that
Chevron had facilitated the Nigerian military’s violent crackdown on oil platform protestors); Mujica v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
(alleging that defendant corporations provided assistance to the Colombian government’s bombing of civilians); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1349
(S.D. Fla. 2003) (alleging that Coca-Cola had facilitated the murder of a union organizer
by a paramilitary group at their Colombian bottling plant); Beanal v. Freeport-
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seeks to ensure such facilitation is subject to proper civil accountability.
Victims of this cruelty rarely achieve justice through their domestic court systems.4 States that sink to the level of torture are seldom
states that provide honest and expedient judicial institutions its victims can access.5 Indeed, “[a] state that practices torture and summary
execution is not one that adheres to the rule of law.”6 Accordingly, a
victim of torture is often forced to look beyond the borders of their
oppressor if they wish to find some fashion of redress.7
Some victims of torture have turned to the United States in their
search for justice. To facilitate this search, in 1992 President George
H.W. Bush signed the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA or Act), creating a private cause of action for victims of torture, as well as extrajudicial execution,8 committed abroad.9 As its title suggests, the broad
purpose of the TVPA was to combat the scourge of state-sponsored
torture around the globe—an act considered a violation of jus cogens
norms in international law.10 In signing the TVPA, President Bush

McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 369 (E.D. La. 1997) (alleging that Indonesian mining
company committed human rights abuses against indigenous population in the course
of its business).
4. See, e.g., No Justice for Torture Victims in Kazakhstan, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 3,
2016, 12:49 PM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/03/kazakhstan
-torture-impunity [https://perma.cc/MX3Q-Q9CL] (“The Kazakh system for investigating police abuses is so riddled with loop-holes and the protection of vested interests
that torturers are able to act with virtual impunity. As long as this continues, the torture will not be effectively tackled, and countless victims will continue to suffer each
year.”).
5. See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (1991).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Litigation, CTR. FOR JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY, https://cja.org/what-we
-do/litigation [https://perma.cc/2LKK-MCYP] (“CJA exposes the world’s fugitive war
criminals and human rights abusers and holds them accountable for the suffering they
have inflicted upon those in society who seek justice.”).
8. This Note uses the phrases “extrajudicial execution,” “extrajudicial killing,”
“summary execution,” and “summary killing” interchangeably. See generally Summary
Execution, CTR. FOR JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY, https://cja.org/human-rights-issues/
summary-execution [https://perma.cc/8TMN-ZY4U] (“Summary execution or extrajudicial killing is a tactic used to terrorize a population and enforce compliance. In
nearly all jurisdictions, summary execution is illegal as an arbitrary deprivation of the
right to life.”).
9. Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
10. “Jus cogens . . . is a latin [sic] phrase that literally means ‘compelling law.’ It
designates norms from which no derogation is permitted.” Anne Lagerwall, Jus Cogens,
OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES, https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo
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affirmed this purpose, saying, “The United States must continue its
vigorous efforts to bring the practice of torture and other gross abuses
of human rights to an end wherever they occur.”11
But today, the TVPA is a shell of its former ambition. While the
TVPA’s legislative history was always clear as to sovereign immunity
under the Act,12 in 2012 the Supreme Court held that non-sovereign
organizations, such as corporations, could also not be held liable under the Act.13 The Court held that the Act’s references to “individuals”
referred solely to “natural persons.”14
While this decision was problematic for TVPA plaintiffs for a
number of reasons, this Note will comment on two specific problems
it caused. First, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the TVPA caused
what this Note will call the “practical problem.”15 The practical problem is simple: if only “natural persons” can face liability under the
TVPA, plaintiffs can only bring suits alleging direct liability against
those who actually committed their torture, rather than an entity for
which they were working.16 But, by the nature of the act, torturers are
almost always anonymous, untraceable, low-level personnel within a
government.17 Thus, the practical problem is one of identification.

-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0124.xml [https://perma.cc/EE7H-VR2K]
(Nov. 7, 2017).
11. George Bush, Statement on Signing the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991,
in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: GEORGE BUSH 437, 437
(1993). Of course, sadly, the United States has had its own reckoning with state-sponsored torture. See Torture, CTR. FOR JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 1 (“The United
States has been widely condemned for torture committed at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo after 9/11, including acts of waterboarding, rectal feeding, and mock executions.”); see also Camille Squires, Torture, Rape, and Kidnapping at the Border: A New
Report Lays Bare the Horror of Trump’s Asylum Plan, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 23, 2020),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/01/migrant-protection-protocols
-remain-in-mexico-trump [https://perma.cc/8HKK-W9AM]. These appalling abuses,
and efforts to rectify them, are beyond the scope of this Note, however.
12. See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7 (1991) (“The legislation uses the term ‘individual’
to make crystal clear that foreign states or their entities cannot be sued under this bill
under any circumstances.”).
13. See Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 451–52 (2012).
14. Id. at 453–54 (“The ordinary meaning of [‘individual’], fortified by its statutory context, persuades us that the Act authorizes suit against natural persons alone.”).
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See Mohamad, 566 U.S. at 456–60.
17. See Brief of Dr. Juan Romagoza Arce et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Mohamad, 566 U.S. 449 (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter Romagoza Arce Brief].
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That said, even if a plaintiff is able to identify their torturer, they
then face what this Note will call the “jurisdictional problem.”18 While
the TVPA provides plaintiffs a cause of action and U.S. federal courts
have subject matter jurisdiction via the federal question doctrine, constitutional due process and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure still
dictate the requirements for establishing personal jurisdiction over a
defendant.19 Gaining personal jurisdiction over a foreign torturer is
often a pipe dream. The chance of serving a low-level torturer traveling to the United States is slim to none, and in the vast majority of
cases, no sufficient contacts will exist to establish personal jurisdiction either.20 Thus, even the identifiable torturer will often never be
subject to a TVPA suit.
This Note argues that these limitations have left the TVPA toothless to serve its original purpose: to create a viable action for civil redress against those who subjected a victim to heinous human rights
abuses.21 Part I of this Note will describe the TVPA and document its
rise and fall as a means to combat human rights abuses abroad over
the last thirty years. It will finish by addressing the state of the TVPA
after the 2012 Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority Supreme Court decision.22 Part II will further flesh out two challenges faced by potential
TVPA plaintiffs after Mohamad, the practical and jurisdictional problems. And finally, Part III will identify a judicial solution that aims to
respect the Supreme Court’s interpretation while restoring some
value to the Act. This Note will suggest that courts should allow for a
robust use of aiding and abetting claims, specifically against corporate
actors—executives, employees, and agents—in order to address the
dichotomy between the TVPA’s stated goals and the current state of
its ability to achieve redress for plaintiffs. Allowing broad recourse to
plaintiffs to assert aiding and abetting claims against those who order,
direct, facilitate, conspire to commit, and benefit from torture or summary execution would help breathe new life into the TVPA.

18. See infra Part II.B; see also Michael J. Stephan, Note, Persecution Restitution:
Removing the Jurisdictional Roadblocks to Torture Victim Protection Act Claims, 84
BROOK. L. REV. 1355, 1357 (2019).
19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4.
20. See, e.g., Stephan, supra note 18, at 1373–75 (giving an example of the jurisdictional problem).
21. See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (1991).
22. Mohamad, 566 U.S. 449.
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I. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE TORTURE VICTIM
PROTECTION ACT
This Part documents the TVPA’s evolving status in U.S. law over
the past thirty years. Section A discusses early human rights litigation
in the United States, which helps contextualize the eventual enactment of the TVPA. Then, Sections B and C detail the legislative history
and text of the TVPA, respectively. Finally, Section D introduces the
initial judicial interpretations and the seminal Supreme Court case regarding the TVPA, Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority.23
A. HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A LEAD-UP TO THE
TVPA
In the United States, the twentieth century’s burgeoning focus on
human rights litigation was highlighted by the “revitaliz[ation]” of the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS) as an avenue for civil redress for victims of
human rights violations around the world.24 Vague in language, this
founding-era statute25 simply reads, “The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.”26 The statute sat dormant for nearly two centuries before being invoked by plaintiffs in the 1980 case Filartiga v. Peña-Irala.27
1. Filartiga: A Novel Use of the ATS
Filartiga involved the kidnapping, torture, and death of a seventeen-year-old Paraguayan, Joel Filartiga, the son of a political opponent to Paraguay’s president, Alfredo Stroessner.28 The Filartiga family alleged that their son had been subject to these brutal acts by the
inspector general of the Asunción police, Americo Peña-Irala.29 When
Peña-Irala moved to the United States in 1978, the Filartiga family
brought suit against him in the Eastern District of New York, claiming

23. Id.
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350; STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10147, THE
RISE AND DECLINE OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 2 (2018).
25. The ATS was enacted as a part of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Rachael E.
Schwartz, “And Tomorrow?” The Torture Victim Protection Act, 11 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMPAR. L. 271, 276 (1994).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (emphasis added).
27. Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
28. Schwartz, supra note 25.
29. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878–80.
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that the ATS gave U.S. courts jurisdiction over tort claims that violate
“the law of nations.”30
In a relative surprise,31 the Second Circuit approved this novel
use of the ATS, saying that Congress could constitutionally pass statutes that “vest the federal courts with jurisdiction over suits which allege that the law of nations has been violated because the law of nations ‘became a part of the common law of the United States upon the
adoption of the Constitution.’”32 On remand, the Filartigas were
awarded over $10 million.33 The decision of the Second Circuit
marked the birth of the modern ATS.
2. Filartiga’s Reception and Rebuke: Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic
However, not all U.S. courts and judges viewed the ATS in the
same manner as the Second Circuit. Just four years later, in Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic,34 the D.C. Circuit cast doubt on the viability of
the ATS to revolutionize human rights litigation in the United States.
In Tel-Oren the court threw out a suit brought under the ATS by victims and the survivors of those killed in a 1978 civilian bus attack in
Israel, blamed on the Palestinian Liberation Organization and its

30. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The Filartiga family claimed that the acts alleged against
Peña-Irala violated a number of international treaties and declarations, as well as customary international law. These sources of law included “wrongful death statutes; the
U.N. Charter; the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; the U.N. Declaration against
Torture; the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and other pertinent
declarations, documents, and practices constituting the customary international law
of human rights and the law of nations.” Schwartz, supra note 25 (quoting Filartiga,
630 F.2d at 879).
31. The case was initially dismissed by the Eastern District of New York for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. Dolly M.E. Filartiga and Joel Filartiga v. Americo Norberto
Peña-Irala, INT’L CRIMES DATABASE, http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/
Case/995/Filartiga-v-Pe%C3%B1a-Irala [https://perma.cc/RZB4-9V4P]; see also
Harrison Smith, Joel Filártiga, Paraguayan Doctor Who Battled Stroessner Dictatorship,
Dies at 86, WASH. POST (July 9, 2019, 10:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/obituaries/joel-filartiga-paraguayan-doctor-who-battled-stroessner
-dictatorship-dies-at-86/2019/07/09/a58cce5a-a253-11e9-b732-41a79c2551bf_
story.html [https://perma.cc/E852-79CF] (“‘A lot of colleagues thought we were
slightly insane,’ Weiss recalled in a phone interview. ‘There really had never been a
case with these facts.’”).
32. Schwartz, supra note 25, at 277 (quoting Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 886).
33. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., https://ccrjustice.org/home/what
-we-do/our-cases/fil-rtiga-v-pe-irala [https://perma.cc/NG6W-KLDS] (Jan. 3, 2019).
34. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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allies. The fractured Tel-Oren opinion35 most notably included a Judge
Robert Bork concurrence, which aggressively critiqued the decision
previously reached by the Second Circuit in Filartiga.36 In short, Judge
Bork contended that the ATS merely provided a jurisdictional grant to
plaintiffs, but no cause of action could be inferred from the statute.37
In other words, plaintiffs would usually need to find a separate cause
of action explicitly granted in domestic or international law to be able
to invoke the ATS and access a U.S. court. Simply “violat[ing] the law
of nations,” as written in the statute,38 did not automatically create a
cause of action.39
The predictable backlash to Filartiga left doubt regarding the viability of the ATS to facilitate human rights litigation in the United
States. This doubt motivated congressional action.
B. THE PURPOSE OF THE TVPA
The passage of the TVPA was in direct response to the view Judge
Bork expressed in Tel-Oren. Namely, the Act explicitly codifies a cause
of action for certain human rights violations committed abroad (torture and extrajudicial killing),40 something Judge Bork claimed the
ATS did not do.41
35. The decision included three separate concurrences. Id. at 775 (Edwards, J.,
concurring), 789 (Bork, J., concurring), 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 798–823 (Bork, J., concurring).
37. Matthew H. Murray, Note, The Torture Victim Protection Act: Legislation To
Promote Enforcement of the Human Rights of Aliens in U.S. Courts, 25 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 673, 691 (1987). In making this determination, Judge Bork said separation of powers principles commanded federal courts to tread lightly in matters relating
to international affairs in order to respect both the executive and legislative branches.
See id. Bork argued that a narrow judicial construction of the ATS—specifically, that an
express grant of Congress was required to hear suits that could affect foreign relations—was thus mandated by separation of powers principles. See id.; S. REP. NO. 102249, at 5 (1991).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
39. Murray, supra note 37, at 692 (“In Judge Bork’s view, the Filartiga court’s
premise that international law itself provides a right to a private remedy is false.”).
Bork wrote that a cause of action could not be inferred from treaties the United States
was a party to and that customary international law only provided a cause of action for
acts that violated the law of nations at the time the ATS became law: “1. Violation of
safe-conducts; 2. Infringement of the rights of embassadors; and 3. Piracy.” Tel-Oren,
726 F.2d at 813 (Bork, J., concurring); see also Virginia A. Melvin, Case Comment, TelOren v. Libyan Arab Republic: Redefining the Alien Tort Claims Act, 70 MINN. L. REV. 211,
218–19, 221–25 (1985) (analyzing Judge Bork’s concurrence).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note; Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 799 (Bork, J., concurring).
41. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801 (“[T]he Second Circuit in Filartiga assumed, that
Congress’ grant of jurisdiction also created a cause of action. That seems to me fundamentally wrong and certain to produce pernicious results. For reasons I will develop,
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Although Congress passed the Act in 1991, nearly eight years after Bork’s provocative concurrence, Senator Arlen Specter introduced
the first version of the bill in 1986, just two years after Bork wrote.42
The TVPA Senate report explicitly remarked on Judge Bork’s judicial
construction of the ATS, saying that the TVPA provided the express
grant of a cause of action Bork claimed was needed to bring a suit under the ATS43: “Judge Robert H. Bork questioned the existence of a private right of action under the [ATS], reasoning that separation of powers principles required an explicit grant by Congress of a private right
of action for lawsuits which affect foreign relations. The TVPA would
provide such a grant . . . .”44 Congress clarified, for every federal court
in the country, that acts of torture and extrajudicial killing committed
abroad had a civil cause of action in U.S. courts, regardless of a court’s
precedent or view on the scope of the ATS.45
The Tel-Oren decision, however, was not the only motivating factor in the enactment of the TVPA. In 1988, just four years prior to the
enactment of the TVPA, the United States had signed the United Nations’ “Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment” (Convention Against Torture, CAT,

it is essential that there be an explicit grant of a cause of action before a private plaintiff
be allowed to enforce principles of international law in a federal tribunal.”).
42. S. 2528, 99th Cong. (1986). When the bill finally passed five years later, Specter was joined by fourteen Senate cosponsors. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (“This legislation is now cosponsored by Senators Leahy, Kennedy, Kohn, Heflin, Adams, Akaka,
Bryan, D’Amato, Inouye, Jeffords, Kerry, McCain, Wellstone, and Wirth.”).
43. Interestingly, the TVPA’s Senate report was a rebuke of Judge Bork’s judicial
construction of the ATS, saying “claims based on torture or summary executions do not
exhaust the list of actions that may appropriately be covered by section 1350.” S. REP.
NO. 102-249, at 5. And the House report on TVPA commented, “[The ATS] should remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already existed or may ripen in
the future into rules of customary international law.” H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4
(1991); see also Brief for Center for Justice & Accountability & Human Rights First as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4, Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, Nos. 19-416, 19453 (Oct. 21, 2020) [hereinafter CJA Brief] (“Congress intended the TVPA to supplement, not supplant, the remedies available under the ATS.”).
44. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4–5.
45. See Jennifer Correale, Comment, The Torture Victim Protection Act: A Vital
Contribution to International Human Rights Enforcement or Just a Nice Gesture?, 6 PACE
INT’L L. REV. 197, 209 (1994) (citing The Torture Victim Protection Act: Hearing and
Markup on H.R. 1417 Before the Subcomm. on Hum. Rts. & Int’l Orgs. of the H. Comm. on
Foreign Affs., 100th Cong. 71 (1988) (statement of Michael H. Posner, Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights)).

2021]

AIDING AND ABETTING TORTURE

2063

or Convention).46 In the TVPA’s legislative history, Congress referenced its obligations under the Convention Against Torture.47
The CAT required state parties to enact various pieces of domestic legislation in order to fulfill their obligations under the treaty.48 For
example, the CAT mandates that “[e]ach State Party shall ensure in its
legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and
has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including
the means for as full rehabilitation as possible.”49 While this provision
did not explicitly require states to create private rights of action for
claims regarding acts committed abroad,50 the Senate report indicates
Congress viewed enacting the TVPA as a part of fulfilling U.S. CAT obligations.51 For example, the report says the TVPA “will carry out the
intent of the [CAT], which . . . obligates state parties to adopt measures
to ensure that torturers within their territories are held legally accountable for their acts.”52
Additionally, Congress suggested that allowing foreigners to sue
for acts committed abroad was a practical necessity to achieving the
goals of the Convention, reasoning that “[j]udicial protection against
flagrant human rights violations is often least effective in those countries where such abuses are most prevalent.”53 And further, that “[a]
state that practices torture and summary execution is not one that adheres to the rule of law.”54 Thus, if a CAT signatory hypocritically made
a common practice of torture, the TVPA would be “designed to
46. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 10020, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
47. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3.
48. Article 4 mandated domestic criminal penalties for torturers, Article 10 mandated education on the CAT for law enforcement and military personnel, and Article
13 mandated protection for complainants and witnesses of torture. CAT, supra note
46, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 at 20, 22, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 114–17.
49. Id. S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 at 13, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 116.
50. See Schwartz, supra note 25, at 286 (“The [CAT] does not appear to demand a
law, such as the TVPA, that provides a private cause of action in the United States entitling plaintiffs to obtain compensation for injuries inflicted in other countries.”).
51. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3–4; see also Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, 74 (1992) (“An Act To carry out obligations of the
United States under the United Nations Charter and other international agreements
pertaining to the protection of human rights by establishing a civil action for recovery
of damages from an individual who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing.”). But
see S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 13 (explaining the minority view that the TVPA “is in tension
with the [CAT]”).
52. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3.
53. Id. at 3–4.
54. Id. at 3.
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respond to this situation by providing a civil cause of action in United
States courts for torture committed” in that country.55
Nothing about the TVPA’s legislative history suggests the Act was
meant to be a toothless gesture. The Act was passed with legitimate
goals in mind. Chief among these was (1) denying “safe haven” to torturers hoping to “hide out” in the United States,56 (2) signaling the
United States’ support of victims of human rights abuses around the
world,57 and (3) addressing confusion regarding the ATS’s ability to
provide those victims a forum for redress,58 by providing a “private
right of action in American courts” to victims of torture and extrajudicial killing.59 Commentators called these ambitions “remarkable”60
and “a serious commitment to human rights around the world and to
the dream that all human beings may one day live free from torture.”61
C. THE TEXT OF THE TVPA
The Torture Victim Protection Act is codified as a “note” to the
ATS: 28 U.S.C. § 1350.62 The Act’s section 2 contains the core provision
of the TVPA.63 Specifically, section 2 creates the private right of action
for torture victims—or the representatives of victims of extrajudicial
killings.64 The scope of liability created by section 2 has been the subject of controversy over the life of the TVPA.65
Section 2 grants both foreigners and U.S. citizens standing to sue
under the TVPA for torture and extrajudicial killing committed

55. Id. at 3–4.
56. Id. at 3.
57. Id. (“[U]niversal principles provide little comfort, however, to the thousands
of victims of torture and summary executions around the world. Despite universal condemnation of these abuses, many of the world’s governments still engage in or tolerate
torture of their citizens, and state authorities have employed extrajudicial killings to
execute many people.”).
58. Id. at 4–5.
59. Correale, supra note 45, at 199.
60. Id. at 198.
61. Id. at 220.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note.
63. Section 1 merely titles the Act. Section 3, on the other hand, defines “torture”
and “extrajudicial killing” for TVPA purposes. Id. These definitions are pulled from
well-established definitions in international law. See CAT, supra note 46, S. TREATY DOC.
NO. 100-20 at 19, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 113; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2.
65. See infra Part I.D.
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abroad.66 Section 2 is broken into three parts. Two of these parts are
procedural, establishing a requirement to exhaust domestic remedies67 and a ten-year statute of limitations.68 The third part of section
2 establishes the scope of liability under the Act.69
In relevant part, the liability provision of section 2 reads:
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of
law, of any foreign nation—(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a
civil action, be liable for damages to that individual; or (2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to
the individual’s legal representative . . . .70

There are two terms that define the scope of liability under the
TVPA: the word “individual” and the phrase “under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law.”71 The word “individual” defines who may
be sued under the Act. In other words, what “entity” may a plaintiff file
a claim against? Conversely, the “authority or color of law” requirement establishes when the TVPA applies to a situation. That is, what
context is required for actions to fall within the TVPA’s orbit? These
statutory terms are discussed in detail below.
1. “Individual”
The use of the word “individual” has confused the scope of liability under the TVPA over the life of the Act. Originally drafted as “person,” the word was changed to “individual” by a 1991 amendment to
the bill.72 The Senate report comments, “The legislation uses the term
‘individual’ to make crystal clear that foreign states or their entities
cannot be sued under this bill . . . only individuals may be sued.”73
However, the Senate report makes no mention of non-state entities’—
such as multinational corporations—liability under the TVPA.74

66. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2. In contrast, the ATS only grants standing to foreigners. Robert F. Drinan & Teresa T. Kuo, Putting the World’s Oppressors on Trial: The Torture Victim Protection Act, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 605, 611 n.45 (1993).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(b).
68. Id. § 2(c).
69. Id. § 2(a).
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Id.
72. Brad Emmons, Tortured Language: Individuals, Corporate Liability, and the
Torture Victim Protection Act, 96 MINN. L. REV. 675, 685–86 (2011).
73. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7 (1991).
74. Id.
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2. “Actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign
nation”
The “authority or color of law” requirement limits the scope of
liability to “those . . . act[ing] in accordance with government sanction.”75 Thus, the TVPA does not apply to “purely private criminal acts
by individuals or nongovernmental organizations.”76 However, the
phrase “actual or apparent authority, or color of law” is broader than
it may first appear.77 For example, the TVPA’s Senate report indicates
this phrase includes acts taken with some form of implicit sanction or
aid by the state, regardless of official, explicit state policy.78 These acts
can be carried out or ordered by government officials or conducted by
private persons who are acting under some sort of approval by the
government or within a “symbiotic” relationship between the private
individual(s) and the government.79 In totality, the TVPA was drafted
so that there must be some connection between a foreign government’s implicit or explicit policy and those who undertook the acts in
question. However, the Senate report instructs courts to use civil
rights law and agency theory “in order to give the fullest coverage possible” under the Act.80
***
In sum, the text of TVPA creates an explicit private right of action
for suits by torture victims (and the representatives of victims of extrajudicial killings) against the individuals responsible for these actions. In order for the TVPA to apply, the acts must have been carried
out with some implicit or explicit approval by the state or by a state
official acting in their official capacity. And when defining what constitutes the forbidden acts, the Act turns to well accepted international
law to make these determinations.
The following Section considers a question courts struggled with
from the TVPA’s inception. How does the TVPA use the word “individual,” and how do different definitions impact its scope?
D. “INDIVIDUAL” AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE EARLY TVPA
The federal courts did not have a universal view of the TVPA upon
its passing. Confusion surrounding the meaning of “individual”
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Drinan & Kuo, supra note 66, at 611.
S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a).
S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8. Indeed, no state has an official policy of torture.
See, e.g., Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1317 (11th Cir. 2008).
S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8.
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quickly resulted in a circuit split. While the legislative history of the
TVPA clearly ruled out suits against “foreign states or their entities,”81
it was silent on suits against non-state entities such as multinational
corporations that may have played a major role in orchestrating, conducting, or funding certain acts of torture.82 Out of this silence, two
competing views formed.
On one side of the split were courts that read “individual”
broadly. This was the view of the Eleventh Circuit. From TVPA’s inception, courts in the Eleventh Circuit consistently espoused the view that
non-state organizations, such as corporations like Coca Cola83 and Del
Monte Produce,84 could be sued under the TVPA as “individuals.”85
However, the majority of courts, including the Fourth,86 Ninth,87 and
D.C. Circuits88 as well as district courts in the Fifth Circuit,89 took the
“narrow” view of the argument, believing that non-state organizations
could not be held liable under the TVPA. The split between the two

81. Id.
82. See infra Part III.A.
83. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (“The
[Senate] Report does not mention any exemption for private corporations, and courts
have held corporations liable for violations of international law under the related
[ATS].”).
84. Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005).
85. See, e.g., Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Under
the law of this Circuit, the Torture Act allows suits against corporate defendants. We
held that . . . in Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc., and we are bound by that precedent.” (citing Aldana, 416 F.3d 1242)); Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F.
Supp. 2d 1250, 1267 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (following the reasoning set forth in Sinaltrainal
and finding that the plaintiff union can assert a TVPA claim against the corporate defendants). See generally Brief for Former Senator Arlen Specter et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449 (2012) (No. 101491) (detailing the TVPA sponsor’s view that the Act did not prohibit the liability of
non-state organizations); Emmons, supra note 72, at 692–93 (explaining how the Sinaltrainal court analyzed the word “individual”).
86. Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 392 (4th Cir. 2011) (“We hold that the TVPA
admits of no ambiguity and Congress’s intent to exclude corporations from liability
under the TVPA is readily ascertainable from a plain-text reading.”).
87. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We . . . hold
that the plain language of the TVPA does not allow for suits against a corporation.”);
Mujica v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“The
Court holds that corporations are not ‘individuals’ under the TVPA based on its reading
of the plain language of the statute.”).
88. Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F.3d 604, 608 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“The Congress used
the word ‘individual’ to denote only natural persons.”).
89. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 382 (E.D. La.
1997), aff’d, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999) (“A finding that the TVPA does not apply to
corporations is not at odds with congressional intent.”).
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constructions of “individual” lasted for nearly fifteen years. Hanging
in the balance was the overall viability of the TVPA.
In 2012, the Supreme Court finally weighed in on the issue in Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority.90 Mohamad was brought by the relatives of Azzam Rahim, a U.S. citizen who was allegedly arrested, imprisoned, tortured, and killed by Palestinian Authority intelligence
officers while visiting the West Bank in 1995.91 Among other things,
the plaintiffs alleged violations of the TVPA.92 The case was brought
only against the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Liberation
Organization. The plaintiffs argued (1) that the PLO was not afforded
sovereign immunity from the TVPA due to its non-state status in the
eyes of the United States,93 and (2) that the word “individual” as used
in the TVPA allowed for suits against “non-state organizations,”94 rather than solely “natural persons”—the Eleventh Circuit’s view.
In a short and unanimous decision, however, the Court found the
TVPA’s plain language to be clear: “[T]he Act authorizes liability solely
against natural persons.”95 The Court declared that the colloquial and
dictionary definitions were united in the view that an “individual” was
a natural person: “We say ‘the individual went to the store,’ ‘the individual left the room,’ and ‘the individual took the car,’” the Court remarked, “each time referring unmistakably to a natural person.”96
While the Court conceded that “the word ‘individual’ [does not] invariably mean ‘natural person’ when used in a statute,” it said its precedent required some indication that Congress intended this result.97
The Court found the TVPA showed no such intention.98
At the end of its Mohamad decision, the Court noted what the ruling meant for future TVPA plaintiffs.99 The Court commented on the
90. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449 (2012).
91. Id. at 452. The U.S. State Department had confirmed Rahim died in the custody
of the Palestinian Authority. Id.
92. Id.
93. And thus, the PLO was a “non-state-organization.” Id. at 453.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 456. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment saying, “[T]he word ‘individual’ is open to multiple interpretations” but “[t]he legislative history of the statute . . . makes up for . . . inadequacies . . . after considering language alone.” Id. at 461
(Breyer, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 454 (majority opinion) (“As a noun, ‘individual’ ordinarily means ‘[a]
human being, a person.’” (citing 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 880 (2d ed. 1989))).
97. Id. at 455; see also, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998) (holding
that the statute in question required “individual” to be broadly construed because the
result would otherwise be “absurd”).
98. Mohamad, 566 U.S. at 455.
99. Id. at 460–61.
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challenge of identifying the “men and women who subject victims to
torture,” let alone establishing personal jurisdiction over them.100
These challenges were easier to solve under a regime where organizations and corporations could be subject to the TVPA. The Court
simply opined, however, that while creating a “toothless” statute was
not the intent of Congress, the plain language of the TVPA could not be
overcome.101
***
As Part II discusses, the Supreme Court’s concerns about the
TVPA’s future effectiveness were well founded.
II. THE TOOTHLESS-NESS OF THE CURRENT TVPA
Regardless of Congress’s original intent, after Mohamad, the
TVPA has indeed become nearly toothless.102 While never meant to be
a judgment juggernaut, the limit of the TVPA’s scope to solely natural
persons has intensified the already uphill battle fought by TVPA plaintiffs.
This Part fleshes out and analyzes two major problems TVPA
plaintiffs face after the Mohamad decision. First, what this Note calls
the “practical problem”—the struggle victims of torture, or the representatives of victims of summary execution, face in simply identifying
the “natural person(s)” responsible for their suffering, as opposed to
identifying an entity that individual was working for or in concert
with.103 Second, this Note describes how a successful identification
may nevertheless do little to bring a defendant inside of a courtroom.104 This is referred to as the “jurisdictional problem”—the challenge of establishing personal jurisdiction over a natural person who
may never step foot in or have any sort of sufficient minimum contacts
with a U.S. venue.
The sum of these problems is clear. While the number of persons
culpable for these atrocities has gone unchanged, the subset of those
100. Id. (“Victims may be unable to identify the men and women who subjected
them to torture, all the while knowing the organization for whom they work. Personal
jurisdiction may be more easily established over corporate than human beings.”).
101. Id. (“[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.” (quoting Rodriguez v.
United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (per curiam))).
102. See, e.g., Fracesco Seatzu, Speculating on the Future of the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) after Mohamad and Kiobel, 8 INTER-AM. & EUR. HUM. RTS. J. 23, 26
(2016) (“Some public international and human rights lawyers have claimed that Mohamad and Kiobel lead to the end of transnational civil litigations on human rights
breaches before U.S. courts.”).
103. See infra Part II.A.
104. See infra Part II.B.
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who are actually realistic TVPA defendants has been shrunken to a
tiny few.
A. THE “PRACTICAL PROBLEM”: IDENTIFYING A TORTURER
The practical problem is a simple one. Those who commit crimes,
especially one as heinous as torture or summary execution, will go to
great lengths to conceal their identities. From the petty thief to the
computer hacker, the vast majority of criminals work to maintain
their anonymity. But in the case of torture or summary execution, it is
especially easy for a perpetrator to remain a nameless and faceless
terrorizer to their victim.105
The modus operandi of a torturer is one of confusion and power.
The torturer has complete control over the victim, who is virtually
powerless to effect any change in the situation or cogently understand
what is happening. “That is of course by design. Those who perpetrate
these types of atrocities often purposefully do so in circumstances that
deny the victims the ability to identify them.”106 For example, a torturer may “blindfold their victims or otherwise deprive them of their
senses; take them to undisclosed locations in the dark of night; [or]
rotate turns among those perpetrating the abuse.”107 Torturers take
great lengths to conceal their personal identities, to confuse and disorient a victim, and to perform their acts in the shadows, away from
public scrutiny.108
However, torturers do not work alone.109 Their acts “are designed, orchestrated, financed, and supported by states, organizations, corporations, and other non-natural persons.”110 These entities
are usually far more recognizable to the torture victim than the perpetrators themselves. For example, “[t]he perpetrators may announce
that they are acting on behalf of a known group or organization; they
may wear uniforms, insignia or logos identifying their association
with a particular group; or the victims may be held in a location
105. Romagoza Arce Brief, supra note 17, at 5 (“As a practical matter, victims often
cannot identify the natural persons who personally and directly perpetrated the human rights crimes against them or their loved ones.”).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 5–6.
108. See id. at 6–7 (describing the experience of amicus curiae Santos Moran who
was kidnapped, blindfolded, and tortured by masked individuals in an undisclosed location).
109. See CJA Brief, supra note 43, at 17 (“Perpetrators of gross human rights abuses
do not act in a vacuum – their actions are made possible through the assistance and
support of numerous others.”).
110. Romagoza Arce Brief, supra note 17, at 2; see infra Part III.A.
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controlled by a particular group or entity.”111 So while a victim may
not know who actually caused their suffering, they may be aware who
it was committed on behalf of.112
As the Center for Justice and Accountability put it, Mohamad created an “artificial and unjust divide among human rights victims”—
that being a divide between those who could identify the natural persons causing their suffering and those who could only identify the entity those natural persons were acting on behalf of.113 In many cases
of torture or summary execution, a victim simply cannot identify the
individual(s) who carried out the crimes and thus falls on the wrong
side of this arbitrary divide.
B. THE “JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM”: ESTABLISHING PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OVER A TORTURER
Even if a plaintiff is successful in identifying their torturer, they
may be nevertheless powerless to bring the perpetrator inside of a
courtroom. Mohamad took an already difficult proposition—establishing personal jurisdiction over orchestrators of foreign torture—
and exacerbated it.114 While the ability of TVPA plaintiffs to establish
the subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts has never faced
intense scrutiny,115 plaintiffs must still adhere to the requirements of
U.S. civil procedure and constitutional due process in order to establish personal jurisdiction over a specific defendant.116
In order to establish personal jurisdiction, plaintiffs must do one
of three things. First, the plaintiff can establish a court’s “general” jurisdiction over the defendant by establishing that the defendant’s contacts with the forum sufficiently render the defendant “at home”
111. Romagoza Arce Brief, supra note 17, at 5.
112. Id. at 5–7 (describing the experience of Moran, who did not know the identity
of her torturers, but recognized their distinctive khaki uniforms as belonging to the
Salvadorian National Police).
113. Id.
114. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449 (2012); see Romagoza Arce Brief,
supra note 17, at 12 (“[M]ost perpetrators of human rights crimes never come to, or
have any connection with, the United States, thus remaining completely beyond the
reach of U.S. courts.”).
115. The vast majority of courts that have addressed the issue have argued that
subject matter jurisdiction for TVPA claims is conferred by the general federal question jurisdiction statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.”); see, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The
[TVPA] permits the appellants to pursue their claims of official torture under the jurisdiction conferred by . . . the general federal question jurisdiction of section 1331.”).
116. See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7 (1991); U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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there.117 If a court is able to establish general personal jurisdiction
over a defendant, the court may “hear any claim against that defendant,” regardless of the claim’s factual relation to the jurisdiction in
question.118
Second, the plaintiff may establish a court’s personal jurisdiction
over the defendant by serving them while they are within the forum
in question, regardless of that defendant’s relation to the forum.119
Finally, the plaintiff can establish a court’s “specific” jurisdiction
over the defendant by establishing that the acts in question have some
sufficient connection to the forum.120 That is, that “the defendant
could anticipate being haled into court in the forum” based on a claim
such as the one at issue.121 Even pre-Mohamad, however, specific jurisdiction was only of limited use to TVPA plaintiffs. This is simply due
to the nature of a TVPA claim. In the large majority of TVPA cases,
claims are made by foreigners, against foreigners, for acts taken in foreign lands. Thus, there are not any sufficient minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum to establish specific personal jurisdiction.
However, Mohamad was indeed a blow to TVPA plaintiffs’ ability
to establish personal jurisdiction over defendants through general jurisdiction or service of process. As the Center for Justice and Accountability said in its amicus brief,
[M]ost perpetrators of human rights crimes never come to, or have any connection with, the United States, thus remaining completely beyond the reach
of U.S. courts. . . .
By contrast, organizations and corporations often choose to do business
in the United States. In so doing, they can subject themselves to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.122

117. General jurisdiction is commonly found using “domicile” or “continuous and
systematic contacts” tests. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 464 (1940); Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).
118. Stephan, supra note 18, at 1368.
119. See Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 610–11 (1990) (“[E]ach State [has]
the power to hale before its courts any individual who [can] be found within its borders . . . by properly serving him with process . . . no matter how fleeting his visit.”).
120. This is commonly known as the “minimum contacts” test. Stephan, supra note
18, at 1370; Stephen E. Arthur, The International Shoe Case—Minimum Contacts, in 21
INDIANA PRACTICE SERIES, CIVIL TRIAL PRACTICE § 4.7 (2d ed. 2020) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
121. Stephan, supra note 18, at 1370.
122. Romagoza Arce Brief, supra note 17, at 12.
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As for general jurisdiction, prior to Mohamad, in cases where liability could factually be tied to a non-natural person,123 it was often
easier to show a defendant was “at home” in the United States. For example, as a hub for global commerce, multinational corporations often
have substantial contacts with, or even corporate offices in, the United
States. These contacts could be substantial enough to lead courts to
“conclude[] that the defendant[] had sufficient ties with the United
States to establish personal jurisdiction.”124 Post-Mohamad, however,
when TVPA suits may only be brought against natural persons, general personal jurisdiction is far more difficult to find. Such jurisdiction
requires that the torturer themselves is “at home” in the United States.
From a practical standpoint, it is unlikely that a torturer, acting on behalf or in concert with a foreign government, would ever make their
domicile in the United States.125 At the broadest level, it is simply rare
for a person to move to a foreign country and establish domicile there.
Additionally, persons linked to abusive regimes may be legally unable
to establish such domicile in the United States.126
In the end, TVPA plaintiffs are left nearly exclusively with in-forum service as the sole means to establish personal jurisdiction. In
fact, in-forum service commenced the vast majority of TVPA cases that
discuss personal jurisdiction.127 It is true that in a pre-Mohamad
world, when organizations could be sued under the TVPA, the reliance
on in-forum service was also heavy. However, Mohamad made in-forum service much more difficult.
123. This was of course, however, subject to the interpretation of jurisdiction in
question.
124. Id. at 12–13 (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 226 F.3d 88, 98–99 (2d
Cir. 2000)).
125. See Stephan, supra note 18, at 1369 (“In the TVPA context, it is unlikely that a
plaintiff will ever be able to rely on general jurisdiction via the domicile method because torturers who conduct their illegal activities outside of the United States are unlikely to move to the United States and establish a domicile there.”). But see Chavez v.
Carranza, 407 F. Supp. 2d 925, 927 (W.D. Tenn. 2004) (“Defendant has resided in the
United States since 1984, and is currently a resident of Memphis, Tennessee.”).
126. See Romagoza Arce Brief, supra note 17, at 12 (“According to government officials, since fiscal year 2004, Immigration and Customs Enforcement has removed
over 400 human rights violators, and is currently pursuing over 1,900 leads and removal cases involving individuals suspected of engaging in human rights crimes from
approximately 95 countries.” (citing Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Unit, U.S.
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, http://www.ice.gov/human-rights-violators [https://perma
.cc/JC2V-YEPS] (Dec. 11, 2020))).
127. See, e.g., Doe v. Constant, 354 F. App’x 543, 546 (2d Cir. 2009); Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995); Chiminya Tachiona v. Mugabe, 216 F. Supp.
2d 262, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1193
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 169 (D. Mass. 1995).
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Previously, the officers of an organization that was engaged in
TVPA-related abuses were open to in-forum service, which could thus
bind the organization itself.128 Thus, even a corporation which was not
“at home” in the United States could be subject to a TVPA suit if one of
its officers traveled to the United States for business or pleasure. After
Mohamad ended organizational liability under the Act, this is no
longer the case. Today, only very specific individuals may be served to
assert direct liability. Most commonly, the torturers themselves must
travel to the United States.129 The logical conclusion is that successfully completing personal service against a possible defendant is far
more difficult than it previously was. In many cases this person is
likely a low-level and unimportant individual with very little reason
to come to the United States,130 not to mention the fact that it is difficult to track the movements of unrecognizable henchmen and be prepared to serve them in what could be a short window of time.131
In totality, Mohamad made the difficult task of establishing personal jurisdiction in a TVPA case that much more difficult. While a specific personal jurisdiction “minimum contact” rationale was already
an unlikely and difficult method in establishing jurisdiction, Mohamad
almost completely removed the possibility of using a general personal
jurisdiction “at home” rationale. And while in-forum service was, and
remains, the dominant method of establishing personal jurisdiction
over these claims, Mohamad made it a more difficult task to complete
by ending the ability to gain personal jurisdiction over an organization
through its officers. In short, even if a torturer is identifiable, they will
likely never see the inside of a U.S. courtroom.
***
The consequences of the practical and jurisdictional problems go
as follows: while torture and extrajudicial killing remain widespread
practices, the pool of realistic, TVPA-accessible defendants remains
far below the actual number of culpable parties. Plaintiffs are often left
with the frustrating reality of not being able to identify their actual
128. Serving Court Papers on a Business, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal
-encyclopedia/free-books/small-claims-book/chapter11-5.html [https://perma.cc/
3YNH-DLS7].
129. Or a direct superior who ordered or allowed the torture. See Steve Vladeck,
MBS and the Torture Victims Protection Act—His Travel to the United States May No
Longer Be an Option, JUST SEC. (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/61111/
mbs-torture-victims-protection-act-1991 [https://perma.cc/M82F-4CED] (describing
that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman could be served with a TVPA suit during a U.S. visit after the Jamal Khashoggi killing).
130. Romagoza Arce Brief, supra note 17.
131. Id.
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attacker or having no legal authority to hale the attacker into court.
The question becomes, in order to achieve some modicum of redress
for potential TVPA plaintiffs, by what means could the pool of accessible defendants be expanded to better match the spiderweb of parties
culpable in these heinous acts?
III. RESTORING SOME EFFICACY TO THE TVPA: AIDING AND
ABETTING CLAIMS AGAINST THE EMPLOYEES AND AGENTS OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
This Note argues for broad recourse to secondary liability claims
to expand the TVPA-accessible defendant pool, specifically, using the
aiding and abetting theory to hold liable corporate executives, employees, and agents who encourage, fund, facilitate, and approve acts
of torture and killing conducted under the color of law abroad.132 Part
III first comments on the efficacy of these domestic secondary liability
claims in addressing the practical and jurisdictional problems of the
TVPA. Section A defines aiding and abetting liability in the civil law
context and highlights cases of international torture and killings
where involvement by key corporate actors was pivotal to their accomplishment. Section B then demonstrates that the use of aiding and
abetting liability would be consistent with the text, legislative history,
and relevant Supreme Court precedent. Finally, Section C acknowledges the difficult questions that would remain even in the face of judicial acceptance of aiding and abetting liability under the TVPA.
A. AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY: THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW DEFINED
AND RELEVANT EXAMPLES ADDRESSED
An aiding and abetting secondary liability claim made via the
TVPA would focus on actors who engage or make explicit agreements
with those who commit heinous acts abroad. Those who would assist
such acts vary, but as this Note posits, multinational corporate interests have been repeat offenders in facilitating, funding, and supporting torture or killing when it was economically advantageous.
Corporations are nothing more than an amalgamation of individuals. Every corporate decision must be undertaken or approved by a
corporate executive, employee, or agent, including unsavory ones. Individual aiding and abetting liability could hold such individuals liable
for violent business decisions.
132. See CJA Brief, supra note 43, at 17 (“Aiding and abetting liability ensures that
participants in atrocity crimes are held accountable and condemns all conduct that significantly contributes to such events.”).
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“[T]he principle underlying [aiding and abetting] is deceptively
simple: helping someone commit a wrong is wrong.”133 The Second
Restatement of Torts is often referred to as the “federal common law”
on the issue of civil aiding and abetting.134 Under this federal common
law, civil aiding and abetting liability is defined as liability “[f]or harm
resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another[.]
[O]ne is subject to [such] liability if he . . . knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or
encouragement to the other so to conduct himself . . . .”135 Thus, federal aiding and abetting requires a mens rea of knowledge and an actus reus of “substantial assistance.” While courts may implement their
own tests for defining “substantial assistance,” “ultimately . . . ‘the
question of liability is a normative one,’ concerning ‘whether a person
is sufficiently involved in the primary wrong . . . such that it is appropriate to hold him or her liable for the primary wrong of the primary
wrongdoer.’”136
There are a number of examples of corporate conduct in which
substantial assistance was knowingly given to facilitate human rights
abuses. A common form of corporation-involved human rights abuses
has been committed in relation to resource extraction practices or labor disputes. These disputes pit large corporations against local populations protesting labor practices, environmental concerns, or other
related issues. The general through line of each allegation is that the
corporation, hoping to maintain revenues, directs, funds, or somehow
encourages a foreign government body, such as a military or police
unit,137 to undertake a campaign of terror in order to put down the
protests or organizing.
Sometimes, as in the case of Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum,138 facilitation of torture and killing can take multiple forms. In Mujica,
133. Sarah L. Swan, Aiding and Abetting Matters, 12 J. TORT L. 255, 259 (2019).
134. See, e.g., id. at 263 n.53; see also Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 608 (11th
Cir. 2015).
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (AM. L. INST. 1979) (emphasis added).
136. Swan, supra note 133, at 257 (quoting JOACHIM DIETRICH & PAULINE RIDGE,
ACCESSORIES IN PRIVATE LAW 4 (2016)). Factors in answering this question include: “the
nature of the act encouraged, the amount of assistance given by the defendant, his
presence or absence at time of tort, his relation to the other [tortfeasor] and his state
of mind.” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876). In the context of a TVPA
case, one court has likened “substantial assistance” to “active participation” in the acts
leading to the suit. See Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1158 (11th Cir.
2005).
137. Or a foreign government-adjacent body, such as a paramilitary.
138. Mujica v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
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employees of Occidental Petroleum, a California-based fossil fuels corporation,139 allegedly worked “in concert” with the Colombian Air
Force (CAF) by knowingly “provid[ing] significant financial support,
supplies, intelligence, logistical support, and other substantial assistance”140 to the CAF. In return, Occidental received protection of its
“oil production facility and pipeline” in Cano Limon, Colombia.141 This
partnership resulted in a 1998 “indiscriminate” cluster bombing of local villages by the CAF.142 Corporate employees and Colombian military officials allegedly used Occidental conferences to plan the bombing, Occidental provided aerial surveillance of the bombing, and
identifiable employees of Occidental’s security service143 directed the
CAF helicopters during the bombing.144
Similarly, in Bowoto v. Chevron, Chevron agents, working in concert with Nigerian military and police and “with the knowledge, direction and approval of Chevron management both in Nigeria and in California,” allegedly requested and funded the torture and killing of
environmental protesters of Chevron’s operations in the Niger
Delta.145 To carry out multiple “terror campaigns,” Chevron employees allegedly met regularly with military and police forces to plan and
coordinate.146 Chevron employees also allegedly provided funding,
transportation, attack helicopters, intelligence information, and actual
manpower to oversee the attacks.147
And in Cardona v. Chiquita it was alleged that Chiquita, a producer
and distributor of agricultural products, paid and armed multiple Colombian paramilitary groups through a secret slush fund.148 These
funds were allegedly distributed in order to conduct “the systematic
intimidation and murder of individuals living in the banana growing
regions near the Gulf of Uraba and in the banana zone of Magdalena in

139. Complaint at 4, Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (No. CV 03-2860).
140. Id. at 14.
141. Id. at 2.
142. Id. at 6–12. The defendants claimed that the bombing was done to protect Occidental’s pipeline from left-wing insurgents. Id. at 9.
143. The three employees were named “Joe Orta, Charley Denny, and Dan
McClintock.” Id. at 8.
144. Id. at 2–3, 7–8.
145. Complaint ¶ 82, Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (No. C 99-2506 SI).
146. Id. ¶ 99(d).
147. Id. ¶ 82.
148. Third Amended Complaint ¶ 4, In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute & S’holder Derivative Litig., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 08-01916).
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Colombia.”149 The plaintiffs produced evidence that prior CEOs, a
member of Chiquita’s board of directors, and multiple other high ranking executives helped review, approve, and organize the payments to
these violent groups.150 The result was the killing and torture of thousands of left-wing “union leaders, and others voicing opposition to the
paramilitaries’ violent control over these regions” or anyone simply
with the misfortune of “residing in the path of Defendants’ paramilitary forces.”151
***
Of course, many acts of torture and extrajudicial killings around
the world have no corporate involvement. However, many stomachturning allegations indeed involve corporate facilitation, including actions by readily identifiable corporate executives and employees. Aiding
and abetting claims would, in part, act as a remedy to the general practical and jurisdictional problems by expanding the pool of realistic defendants to corporate executives and employees who may be far more
recognizable than the average torturer and have many more U.S. contacts.
In each of these examples, multinational corporations and their
actors facilitated the torture and extrajudicial killing of local individuals who were perceived as threats to a revenue stream. Plaintiffs, with
the help of attorneys and investigators, ostensibly reviewed corporate
records and other available information to identify the corporate actors directly involved.152 With regards to the aforementioned “practical problem,” these examples make clear that the discrete and identifiable participation of employees, executives, or agents are often
discernable for litigants. Certainly, these higher-profile actors are
more visible than the henchmen who carry out the acts.
As for the jurisdictional problem, many corporations or organizations that conduct business in or are headquartered in the United
States and are alleged to have assisted or benefited from foreign torture or summary execution may have personnel at their U.S. locations
who took part in coordinating with and aiding the torturers or killers.
This, of course, leaves them open to personal jurisdiction through
domicile or in-forum service of a secondary liability claim under the
TVPA. Additionally, “aiding and abetting executives” who do not live

149. Id. ¶ 3.
150. Id. ¶ 2048.
151. Id. ¶ 4.
152. See Complaint, supra note 139; Complaint, supra note 145; Third Amended
Complaint, supra note 148.
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in the United States are far more likely to travel here on business, vacation, or otherwise than their torturing henchmen.
To hold accountable those who make these torturous acts possible, claims of aiding and abetting liability against corporate actors
could prove useful. These claims could hold accountable the “approving” CEO, the “directing” board member, the “funding” operations executive, or the “coordinating” security director.
B. JUDICIAL HOSTILITY TO AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY: A
MISINTERPRETATION OF THE TVPA AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
While secondary liability claims such as aiding and abetting could
buoy the post-Mohamad TVPA, courts have been hesitant to recognize
these claims or are inconsistent in their application. Aiding and abetting criminal culpability is deeply rooted in criminal codes around the
world, but aiding and abetting civil liability has been infrequently used
in U.S. litigation, often only in niche areas such as business torts, and
yes, human rights litigation.153 The lack of established usage for civil
aiding and abetting claims has led to widely varying judicial acceptance and application of the doctrine, including in TVPA cases.154
As this Section notes, whether or not the Act properly allows for
aiding and abetting liability has been a subject of debate in the courts.
Generally, there are two layers of examination when analyzing the validity of aiding and abetting liability under the TVPA. First, a court
must determine whether the TVPA should be interpreted using principles of international or domestic law. As this Section details, even
though the TVPA relates to the general sphere of international human
rights, as a formal matter, the Act is properly interpreted as a standard
domestic statute, no different than any one of thousands of laws enacted by Congress.
Next, a court must then analyze the Act’s text and history, Supreme Court precedent, and general principles of American law to determine the applicability of aiding and abetting under the TVPA. Counter to the position taken by various courts, these factors strongly
suggest that the TVPA incorporates aiding and abetting secondary liability.

153. See, e.g., supra note 152.
154. See Swan, supra note 133, at 258 (noting the lack of “doctrinal coherence” for
civil aiding and abetting liability).
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1. The TVPA Should Be Interpreted Based on Domestic Principles of
U.S. Law
In the context of international human rights litigation, a court analyzing the viability of an aiding and abetting claim must first choose
whether general principles of international or domestic law inform its
examination. In cases involving the TVPA, many courts have—as this
Note posits, incorrectly—chosen to analyze the TVPA using principles
of international law.
Courts that analyze the TVPA as a question of international law
often inappropriately conflate Alien Tort Statute analysis with TVPA
analysis. However, TVPA analysis contains fundamentally different
considerations as compared to the ATS. On the one hand, ATS analysis
properly evokes international law because, as the Supreme Court held
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the ATS “is a jurisdictional statute creating
no new causes of action,”155 and the ATS only provides for civil liability
for acts taken “in violation of the law of nations.”156 In other words, the
ATS provides civil liability in the United States for certain violations of
international law. Thus, “international law is crucial to the ATS analysis.”157 When defining secondary theories of liability under the ATS, it
is appropriate and necessary to look to international law.158
The TVPA is fundamentally different, both in structure and in
substance, from the ATS. While the TVPA’s contextual history is necessarily linked to the ATS,159 the TVPA is not dependent on international law to define violations of the Act. Like any other “standard”
federal statutory scheme, “the TVPA sets forth the prohibited behavior within the Act itself.”160 Additionally, the text of the TVPA does not
in any way invoke international law as the ATS does. The TVPA is rather a simple federal civil cause of action like any number of other federal statutes that are interpreted using general principles of domestic
law.161
155. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 694 (2004).
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (emphasis added).
157. Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 606 n.41 (11th Cir. 2015).
158. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258
(2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]his Court has repeatedly emphasized that the scope of the [ATS’s]
jurisdictional grant should be determined by reference to international law. . . . [W]hile
domestic law might provide guidance on whether to recognize a violation of international norms, it cannot render conduct actionable under the ATS.”).
159. See supra Parts I.A–B.
160. Doe, 782 F.3d at 606 n.41.
161. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 125 (2013) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“[TVPA] cases will be determined in the future according to the detailed
statutory scheme Congress has enacted.”). A good example of ATS-TVPA conflation
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Of course, beyond a statute’s text, persuasive legislative history
could dictate the use of international law principles in certain instances162—for example, the TVPA’s Senate report directly and clearly
approves the use of “command responsibility,” a doctrine of international law, to find secondary liability in TVPA claims.163 However, the
legislative history has no analogous mention of aiding and abetting
and international law. Even while approving “lawsuits against persons who . . . abetted, or assisted in the torture,”164 the TVPA’s legislative history makes no explicit mention of aiding and abetting and international law principles.
In short, within the context of a standard statutory scheme,
where both text and legislative history are silent on whether domestic
or international law should be used to interpret the Act, it is most natural that “the TVPA should be interpreted through . . . general principles of domestic law,”165 rather than looking to international law interpretations.
2. Supreme Court Precedent, the TVPA’s Legislative History, and
Principles of U.S. Tort Law Support Aiding and Abetting Liability
Under the TVPA
Assuming that the issue of secondary liability ought to be decided
as a question of U.S. federal common law, the next question is whether
the existence of secondary liability can be implied from the statutory
text. Here, courts skeptical of aiding and abetting claims point to
took place in a Northern District of Alabama case. There the court cited a Second Circuit case, Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d at 258, to support is conclusion that
aiding and abetting claims under the TVPA were controlled by international law. The
only problem? Presbyterian Church of Sudan only involved an ATS claim, and not a
TVPA claim. Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 09-CV-1041, 2013 WL 3873938, at *5 (N.D.
Ala. July 25, 2013).
162. Doe, 782 F.3d at 606 (“[W]hen we do look to general principles of international law for guidance . . . we do so only because the TVPA itself implicitly or explicitly
incorporated those principles from international law.”).
163. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 9 (1991) (“Under international law, responsibility for
torture . . . extends beyond the person or persons who actually committed those acts –
anyone with higher authority who authorized . . . those acts is liable for them.”). In
short, “command responsibility” is the concept that commanders are responsible for
the actions of their subordinates. Id. This involves a litigant showing three elements:
“(a) the commander had a superior-subordinate relationship with the troops that committed the human rights abuses; (b) the commander knew, or should have known, that
these troops were committing such offenses; and (c) the commander failed to prevent
or repress the abuses.” Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 706, 719–21 (2002).
164. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8.
165. Doe, 782 F.3d at 607.
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Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., a
“watershed” 1994 Supreme Court decision on the issue of implied secondary liability in the face of a “silent” statute.166 As this Subsection
makes clear, however, courts’ reading of Central Bank has exceeded
the scope of the Supreme Court’s holding in that case, causing many to
misapply Central Bank’s precedent. Additionally, some courts have inappropriately ignored the TVPA’s legislative history as well as later
Supreme Court precedent on civil secondary liability.167 After analyzing Central Bank, this Subsection reviews the larger picture, showing
that aiding and abetting liability properly attaches to the TVPA and
complies with the Mohamad decision.
a. Central Bank
The complainants in Central Bank were purchasers of 2.1 million
dollars’ worth of debt bonds, which quickly became worthless after
the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority, which issued the bonds, defaulted.168 The bond holders alleged that the Authority committed securities fraud under the Securities Act of 1934
and that the Central Bank of Denver aided and abetted this fraud as
the appraiser and indenture trustee of the bond issues.169 However, in
a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that aiding and abetting liability was inconsistent with the Securities Act of 1934, and thus Central
Bank could not be held liable for facilitating the fraud.170
The Court based its analysis on the plain language of § 10(b), the
section of the Securities Act that provided for the claim at issue.171 Section 10(b) was silent on aiding and abetting liability, and the Court refused to infer congressional approval of such liability.172 “Congress
knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do
so. . . . If . . . Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting liability . . . it would have used the words ‘aid’ and ‘abet’ in the statutory
text. But it did not.”173 However, conspicuously, the Supreme Court
stopped short of holding that civil aiding and abetting liability was
only applicable if explicitly provided for in a statute. Instead, the Court
166. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994); Swan, supra note 133, at 261, 268.
167. See infra Parts III.B.2.b–c.
168. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 167–68.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 191.
171. Id. at 168.
172. Id. at 191.
173. Id. at 176–77.
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seemed to cabin the holding of Central Bank within the facts of the case
itself—finding the text and history of the provision at issue insufficient to support aiding and abetting liability.174 As for a future interpretive principle, the Court only went as far as to say that silence did
not create a “general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and abettors.”175 Presumably, however, a silent statute may clear
this lack of presumption in certain circumstances.
b. Expansive View of Central Bank in TVPA Cases
To find aiding and abetting liability prohibited under the TVPA, a
number of courts have cited the Supreme Court’s opinion in Central
Bank. Predominantly, these courts have correctly noted that Central
Bank did not create a requirement of explicit statutory approval for
secondary liability to properly attach under an act.176 However, these
courts have found the TVPA providing insufficient congressional intent to get over Central Bank’s rule that “there is no general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and abettors.”177 In other
words, these courts have said there is no presumption of aiding and
abetting liability under Central Bank, and the TVPA’s history and context do not overcome that lack of presumption.
Most notably, the Southern District of New York (S.D.N.Y.), often
venue to human rights litigation, has recently read Central Bank to
preclude such liability.178 For example, in Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., the
court said the “TVPA does not permit aiding-and-abetting liability. . . .
The plaintiffs argue that . . . such a theory of liability should be presumed. However, the Supreme Court has adopted a default rule that is
174. For example, the Court pointed out that a civil securities fraud claim was not
a “usual” tort claim and that the Securities Act of 1934 had explicitly mentioned aiding
and abetting liability in other sections, showing specific congressional consideration
of the issue in that particular act. Id. at 194. Likewise, the Court’s conclusion of its Central Bank opinion speaks strictly to the facts of the case. See id. at 191 (“Because the
text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we hold that a private plaintiff
may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b).”).
175. Id. at 182.
176. But see Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 689 (7th Cir.
2008) (en banc) (“[S]tatutory silence on the subject of secondary liability means there
is none.”).
177. Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 297, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting
Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 182).
178. Id.; see also Sikhs for Just. v. Nath, 893 F. Supp. 2d 598, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(“Additionally, some courts have . . . found that the TVPA does not permit liability for
aiding and abetting.”); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (“[T]his Court finds that creating aider and abettor liability . . . [is] precluded by
Central Bank.”).
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exactly opposite to the plaintiffs’ suggestion.”179 In the 2012 case Sikhs
for Justice v. Nath, the S.D.N.Y. seemed to reaffirm this position: “The
text of the TVPA is silent as to aiding and abetting, and such silence
should not be interpreted as granting and authorizing that liability.”180
Additionally, the Second Circuit has cast doubt on secondary liability claims under the TVPA. In a footnote in 2014’s Chowdhury v.
Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., the Second Circuit called aiding and
abetting liability “an ‘ancient criminal law doctrine’ that is generally
presumed not to apply in civil suits.”181 In other proceedings, both the
Ninth182 and District of Columbia183 Circuits also cast doubt on the applicability of aiding and abetting liability to the TVPA, without ultimately answering the question.184
179. Mastafa, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 300.
180. Sikhs for Just., 893 F. Supp. 2d at 618. However, because Sikhs for Justice was
brought after Mohamad and was a suit against an organization, the court threw out the
TVPA claim without ultimately and finally addressing the overall viability of aiding and
abetting under the TVPA.
181. Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Ltd.,746 F.3d 42, 53 n.10 (2d Cir.
2014) (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 181–82). The Second Circuit did not have
to ultimately answer the question of TVPA and aiding and abetting liability. See id.
(“The District Court dismissed the aiding-and-abetting claim against Khan, and therefore we need not address whether the TVPA recognizes that theory of liability . . . .”).
182. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010) (saying the
TVPA did not “contemplate [corporate aiding and abetting] liability,” but stopping
short of precluding aiding and abetting liability against natural persons). However, the
Northern District of California decided that “[i]n light of the Ninth Circuit’s wording in
[Bowoto] . . . this Court finds that the Ninth Circuit intended that claims for vicarious
liability, including aiding and abetting, cannot be brought under the TVPA.” Doe I v.
Cisco Sys., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1247 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
183. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (stating it could not
support “the inference that Congress so provided [for aiding and abetting liability] in
the TVPA,” and “[e]ven assuming arguendo that aiding and abetting liability is available
under the TVPA, the court’s precedent would limit such liability to natural persons”).
184. A handful of other district courts also found Central Bank to preclude TVPA
aiding and abetting liability, although on somewhat different theories. Chiefly, these
courts have leaned on the TVPA requirement that the torturer or killer must have acted
“under color of law” to violate the TVPA. An aider and abettor, the analysis goes, must
act under color of law as well. Courts have been unclear, however, whether the “color
of law” requirement precludes all aiding and abetting liability against corporate employees and executives, or only such liability under certain fact patterns. For example,
the Western District of Washington said simply, “an aiding and abetting claim is inconsistent with the TVPA’s explicit requirement that a defendant must have acted under
‘color of law,’” without explaining if it was referring to the facts of that case or TVPA
claims generally. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1027 (W.D. Wash.
2005), aff’d, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007). There is good reason to believe that this
holding may have only applied to the facts of that case. In Corrie, the plaintiffs were
suing Caterpillar over its sale of machines to Israel. Israel then used those machines in
the destruction of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, rather than encouraging or facilitating
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Though Central Bank’s text does not require aiding and abetting
liability to be explicitly approved in a statute, courts have used its
“general presumption” against secondary liability to throw out such
claims under the TVPA, seemingly without conducting a deep analysis
of the issue.185 But as is detailed below, in light of the TVPA’s legislative history and later Supreme Court precedent, courts that preclude
aiding and abetting liability after a domestic law analysis are missing
the whole picture.
c.

TVPA Legislative History Endorses Aiding and Abetting Liability

As the Central District of California succinctly put it, “Central Bank
stands for the proposition that ‘when Congress enacts a statute under
which a person may sue and recover damages from a private defendant for the defendant’s violation of some statutory norm, there is no
general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue for aiders and abettors.’”186 But how far does this lack of “general presumption” go?
Seemingly, there is some gray area—between a statute silent on secondary liability and a statute that explicitly provides for such liability—in which certain “silent statutes” can hurdle over the “general
presumption” against secondary liability.187 But what factors contribute to such a hurdle?
Israeli torture to benefit a specific Caterpillar business interest—such as protecting a
plant or supply chain. The court then held that “where a seller merely acts as a seller,
he cannot be an aider and abettor.” Id. Meanwhile, some courts have used the kitchen
sink approach to preclude aiding and abetting liability from the TVPA. For example,
the Southern District of Texas used multiple anti-aiding and abetting analyses citing
both Corrie and Mastafa, which took different routes to get to what the Southern District of Texas believed was the same outcome: “[The TVPA] does not permit liability
for aiding and abetting a primary violator.” Weisskopf v. United Jewish Appeal-Fed’n
of Jewish Philanthropies of N.Y., Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 912, 924 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (citing
Mastafa, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 300; and then citing Corrie, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 1027).
185. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 58 (making the conclusory statement,
“[e]ven assuming arguendo that aiding and abetting liability is available under the
TVPA, the court’s precedent would limit such liability to natural persons,” without
elaborating); accord Doe I, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 124 (stating, “[T]his Court finds that the
Ninth Circuit intended that claims for vicarious liability, including aiding and abetting,
cannot be brought under the TVPA,” after the Ninth Circuit had only commented on
corporate secondary liability); Mastafa, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 300 (citing Central Bank for
the proposition that a silent statute cannot incorporate aiding abetting liability without reviewing the TVPA’s legislative history).
186. Mujica v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1177–78 (C.D. Cal.
2005) (emphasis added) (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 182).
187. Id. (“[T]his proposition is different than a rule which precludes aiding and
abetting liability unless expressly provided for via the language of the statute.”); see
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., No. 96 CIV. 8386, 2002 WL 319887, at *16 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 28, 2002) (“Central Bank [does not] hold[] that a statute must explicitly allow for
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First and foremost, a statute’s legislative history can fill the gaps
and ambiguities left by its text. While the TVPA’s text makes no express mention of secondary liability claims,188 this does not mean Congress refused to manifest approval of such claims. Indeed, the Central
Bank Court acknowledged that legislative history could be used to
“impl[y] that [secondary liability is] covered by” a statute.189 Though
often left unaddressed by courts undertaking this analysis, the TVPA’s
legislative history in fact noddingly approves of aiding and abetting
liability.190 One need not look deeply into the TVPA’s legislative history to find that the TVPA was intended to reach beyond the torturers
or killers themselves.
First, the Senate report includes the sentence, “[t]he legislation is
limited to lawsuits against persons who . . . abetted or assisted in the
torture.”191 While this phrase is admittedly not dispositive of congressional intent, it is undoubtedly a strong starting block from which to
form a pro-aiding and abetting argument. Courts that have found secondary liability inapplicable under the TVPA have seemingly “failed to
notice” or ignored the phrase, while those accepting of such liability
have highlighted it.192

secondary liability in order for a court to hold aiders and abetters [sic] or co-conspirators liable.”). But see Note, Central Bank and Intellectual Property, 123 HARV. L. REV. 730,
730 (2010) (“Central Bank involved a securities statute. Yet its reasoning is of such
breadth that courts have extracted from it a general rule: ‘[S]tatutory silence on the
subject of secondary liability means there is none.’” (alteration in original)).
188. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note; see supra Part I.C. But see CJA Brief, supra note 43, at
12–13 (arguing that the use of the word “subjects” in the TVPA’s text shows explicit
evidence the Act was intended to reach aiders and abettors).
189. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 183.
190. See CJA Brief, supra note 43, at 6 (“A plain reading of the TVPA and an examination of its legislative history make clear that Congress intended the statute to encompass liability for individuals who aided and abetted torture and extrajudicial killing abroad.”).
191. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8 (1991) (emphasis added); see CJA Brief, supra note
43, at 13 (“This extension of liability to all responsible parties reflects Congress’ abhorrence of torture.”).
192. Cora Lee Allen, Note, Aiding and Abetting in Torture: Can the Orchestrators of
Torture Be Held Liable?, 44 N. KY. L. REV. 149, 163 (2017). Indeed, all found cases that
reject aiding and abetting liability against individuals decline to reference the sentence. Compare Sikhs for Just. v. Nath, 893 F. Supp. 2d 598, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), Mastafa
v. Chevron Corp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 297, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), and Corrie v. Caterpillar,
Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1027 (W.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007),
with Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 607–08 (11th Cir. 2015), Mujica v. Occidental
Petrol. Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1177–78 (C.D. Cal. 2005), and Wiwa, 2002 WL
319887, at *15–16.
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Additionally, footnote 16 in the TVPA’s Senate report shows approval of secondary liability in TVPA claims.193 The footnote, cited to
affirm the Senate’s assertion that “responsibility for torture . . . extends
beyond the person or persons who actually committed those acts,”194
references two international agreements, each of which conclude that
liability extends beyond the torturer himself.195 Those agreements are
the CAT,196 which says a person who merely “participat[es] in torture”
must be subject to penalty,197 and the Inter-American Convention to
Prevent and Punish Torture,198 which says that a person who “instigates or induces the use of torture” is guilty of a crime.199 By citing
these international agreements, which support the proposition that
individuals beyond the torturer must face penalties for acts they help
to facilitate, Congress further indicated its support for secondary liability under the TVPA.
Some courts analyzing the issue have indeed found the TVPA’s
legislative history sufficient to overcome Central Bank’s holding. The
Eleventh Circuit, ostensibly the only appellate court to definitively answer the question, has articulated this multiple times. For example, in
Doe v. Drummond Co. the court said,
[T]he legislative history endorses an expansive view of liability under the TVPA:
“[R]esponsibility for torture . . . extends beyond the person . . . who actually
committed those acts . . . .” Thus, theories of liability under domestic law are
available to support TVPA claims by providing a theory of tort liability when
the defendant did not personally commit the underlying act.200

Likewise, in Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, the Eleventh Circuit said,
“An examination of legislative history indicates that the TVPA was intended to reach beyond the person who actually committed the acts,
to those ordering, abetting, or assisting in the violation.”201
193. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 9 n.16.
194. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
195. Id. at 9 n.16; see CJA Brief, supra note 43, at 14 (“[T]he existence of aiding and
abetting liability and other forms of secondary liability under the law of nations had
been well-established by the time of the TVPA’s enactment.”).
196. CAT, supra note 46, at art. 4.
197. Id.
198. Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention To Prevent and
Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 67 (emphasis added).
199. Id.
200. Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 607–08 (11th Cir. 2015) (first alteration
in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Mamani v. Sánchez Bustamante, 968 F.3d 1216, 1220 (11th Cir. 2020) (“We have previously held that the TVPA
is not restricted to claims based on direct liability and that legal representatives can
recover based on theories of indirect liability, including aiding and abetting . . . .”).
201. 402 F.3d 1148, 1157 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8–9
(1991)).
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Outside of the Eleventh Circuit, a handful of other courts have
come to a similar conclusion. In Mujica, the Central District of California said, “[T]he legislative history of the TVPA rather unequivocally
states that the statute encompasses aiding and abetting theories of liability,” while pointing to the Senate report’s use of the phrase “ordered, abetted, or assisted in the torture” when defining the Act’s
scope.202 Additionally the Northern District of California called aiding
and abetting liability “presumably” attached to the TVPA, and the
Eastern District of Virginia cited Mohamad as supporting aiding and
abetting liability under the TVPA.203
Furthermore, though in later cases it has since ruled differently,
an early S.D.N.Y. case to answer this question found aiding and abetting to properly attach to the TVPA in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co.204 There, pointing to the same Senate report language as Mujica,
the S.D.N.Y. said,
Central Bank . . . support[s] the proposition that the scope of liability under a
statute should be determined based on a reading of the text of the specific
statute. . . . [T]he Court finds that the language and legislative history of the
TVPA supports liability for aiders and abettors of torture and extrajudicial
killings.205

Central Bank’s holding does not leave aiding and abetting claims
inapplicable to all statutes silent on the issue. A silent statute is not an
outright ban on such claims. On the contrary, in Central Bank, the Supreme Court acknowledged that congressional intent, and thus a statute’s legislative history, was relevant in these determinations.206 This
Note argues that the TVPA’s legislative history is quite clear on this
point. A number of federal courts have agreed, finding the presumptive congressional intent to overcome Central Bank’s refusal to presume aiding and abetting liability in federal statutes.
202. Mujica v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
(emphasis added) (“Under ‘Scope of liability’, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report
states that the ‘legislation is limited to lawsuits against persons who ordered, abetted,
or assisted in the torture.’ Thus, the legislative history with respect to the TVPA indicates that the statute provides for aiding and abetting liability.” (footnote omitted) (citing S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8)).
203. Doe I v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1332 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Yousuf v. Samantar,
No. 1:04cv1360, 2012 WL 3730617, at *10–13 (E.D. Va. Aug. 28, 2012).
204. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., No. 96 CIV. 8386, 2002 WL 319887, at *15–
16 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (“In the Committee Report, the Senate Judiciary Committee
explained that the Act would permit suits ‘against persons who ordered, abetted, or
assisted in torture.’” (citing S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8)).
205. Id.
206. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 183 (1994) (noting that the “history” of a federal statute may imply “that aiding
and abetting was covered by the statutory prohibition”).
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d. Meyer v. Holley and Ordinary Principles of Tort Law
Beyond legislative history, the Supreme Court has counseled that
“ordinary background . . . principles [of law]” can support an inference
of congressional intent to provide for certain forms of secondary liability.207 In other words, when Congress legislates in the context of
certain fields of law, common principles of that field can support the
imposition of secondary liability even in the face of a silent statute. In
Meyer v. Holley, the Supreme Court commented on one of these fields,
the field of tort law.208
Meyer was brought in 2003 by an interracial couple claiming discrimination in housing violating the Fair Housing Act. Though the Fair
Housing Act is silent on any forms of secondary liability, the Court
found certain secondary liability “well established,”209 allowing the
couple to sue the corporate broker who employed the allegedly discriminatory real estate agent under a theory of vicarious liability.210
Its rationale for this position was simple. First, the Court noted “an action brought for compensation by a victim of housing discrimination
is, in effect, a tort action.”211 And second, “the Court . . . assume[s] that,
when Congress creates a tort action, it legislates against a legal background of ordinary tort-related vicarious liability rules and consequently intends its legislation to incorporate those rules.”212 In other
words, the Court said that when Congress legislates in the field of
torts, it does so understanding that vicarious liability is a general principle in tort law.
The TVPA is unquestionably within the realm of tort law.213 However, most courts addressing the question of aiding and abetting liability under the TVPA have made no mention of Meyer in their
207. Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 286 (2003).
208. Id. at 285; cf. Note, supra note 186 (“[I]n Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., the Court endorsed secondary liability for trademark infringement
without locating a basis for it in the trademark statute.” (citing Inwood Lab’ys, Inc. v.
Ives Lab’ys, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982))).
209. Meyer, 537 U.S. at 285.
210. Id. at 283. Vicarious liability is “a form of strict secondary liability that arises
under the common law doctrine of agency.” Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to
Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192,
224 (2009).
211. Meyer, 537 U.S. at 285.
212. Id. (citing Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 709
(1999)).
213. Dictionary.com defines “tort” as “a wrongful act . . . that results in injury to
another’s person.” Tort, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/tort
[https://perma.cc/EK7Q-4MLP].
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analysis.214 To this end, some commentators have argued that the Supreme Court implicitly distinguished Meyer from Central Bank by limiting its Meyer holding to vicarious liability, without commenting on
other forms of secondary liability.215 In other words, it held that vicarious liability is an ordinary principle in tort law, but forms of “contributory liability,” such as aiding and abetting are not. This may truly be
the case. Indeed, it’s difficult to square the Court’s unanimous holding
in Meyer with its Central Bank holding without coming to the conclusion that the Court was doing implicit line drawing between vicarious
liability and other forms of secondary liability.216
However, at least one court has cited the Meyer case to support
the proposition that aiding and abetting is a general principle in tort
law. This again was the Eleventh Circuit in Drummond. There, the
court annunciated that, under Meyer, unless the TVPA’s text or legislative history “disavow reliance on traditional theories of tort liability
for secondary actors,” aiding and abetting liability should be presumptively attached to the Act.217 After finding no such disapproval, the
court concluded that the TVPA allowed for aiding and abetting claims
made against individuals under the TVPA.218
While the position taken in Drummond is ostensibly a minority
one, the Meyer holding and its articulation of the relevance of “ordinary background . . . principles [of law]”219 in finding secondary liability under a provision is worth mentioning. What’s more, the four-Justice Central Bank dissent quoted early decisions that called “aiding
and abetting theory, grounded in ‘general principles of tort law.’”220
This Note suggests that future courts may be able to leverage Meyer,
the Central Bank dissent, and the Court’s general emphasis on principles of law in its statutory interpretations to find further support for
aiding and abetting liability under the TVPA.
214. In some ways, however, this is understandable, as the majority of claims including aiding and abetting liability have been simply thrown out because they were
made against corporate entities, leaving courts no reason to conduct a deep and substantive analysis of the TVPA and aiding and abetting liability. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
215. See, e.g., Note, supra note 185, at 731 n.12 (“[T]wo unanimous Supreme Court
decisions post-Central Bank . . . endorsed implied vicarious liability without raising a
Central Bank objection.”).
216. For one thing, the Meyer case came just nine years after Central Bank.
217. Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 607 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Meyer, 537
U.S. at 287).
218. Id.
219. Meyer, 537 U.S. at 286.
220. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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***
Secondary liability claims are perfectly consistent with the TVPA.
Central Bank’s precedent does not stand for the proposition that a silent statute may not provide for secondary liability. Thus, a court
should not deny the use of secondary liability under the TVPA based
on that case alone. The legislative history of an act may fill the gaps
left by a silent statute. Indeed, the legislative history of the TVPA unambiguously shows congressional intent to allow for all forms of secondary liability claims, in a manner that likely reaches the Central
Bank general presumption hurdle.221 Additionally, the Court’s holding
in Meyer regarding the “ordinary” principles of tort law gives a court
flexibility to make an argument that aiding and abetting liability is or
has become a general principle with regard to certain torts. A court’s
decision to allow secondary liability under the TVPA is well supported.
e.

Compliance with Mohamad

Finally, allowance for TVPA aiding and abetting liability against
individuals complies with the Supreme Court’s holding in Mohamad.
Mohamad limited the scope of liability provided by the TVPA to the
“natural person.”222 Thus, claims under the TVPA cannot be brought
against organizations or other entities.223
However, the decision does nothing to indicate that liability under the TVPA cannot extend beyond the torturer(s) themselves. In
fact, the Court did just the opposite, saying, “the TVPA contemplates
liability against officers who do not personally execute the torture or
extrajudicial killing . . . .”224 While the use of “officer” is a clear reference to the command responsibility doctrine, nowhere in the decision
did the Court indicate command responsibility was the only applicable
form of secondary liability.225 Indeed, when secondary liability was
raised in Mohamad the Court said that just because the “petitioners
rightly note that the TVPA contemplates liability against officers” it
“does not follow . . . that the Act embraces liability against non-sovereign organizations.”226 But the Court never goes further than striking
221. See supra Parts III.B.2.b–c. See generally Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566
U.S. 449, 551–57 (2012) (discussing the rationale of the implicit limitation of liability
to natural persons).
222. Mohamad, 566 U.S. at 451; see supra Part I.D.
223. See supra Part I.D.
224. Mohamad, 566 U.S. at 458.
225. See supra note 164 (discussing “command responsibility”).
226. Id. (emphasis added).
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down the petitioners’ assertion that secondary liability can be levied
against organizations, and it never indicates that there is any limitation on the use of secondary liability against individuals.227
Whether intentional or not, the text of Mohamad does nothing to
limit the scope of liability individuals can face under TVPA theories of
secondary liability. This gives a lower court plenty of daylight to find
aiding and abetting liability as consistent with Mohamad.
C. THE ATTACHMENT OF AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER THE
TVPA IS A LIMITED SOLUTION
It is necessary to conclude by conceding that the solution proposed by this Note is a limited one. Its limitation is true with regard to
the viability of the TVPA itself, and certainly with regard to the
broader context of U.S. deterrence and adjudication of human rights
abuses abroad.
Most directly, while aiding and abetting liability could be valuable
in expanding the pool of individuals who are both TVPA-reachable and
culpable for human rights abuses, it would not return the Act to its
pre-Mohamad standing. Organizations will always be more identifiable and more easily hauled into court than individual actors in the context of human rights abuses. What’s more, organizations will usually
have far bigger funds to pay compensatory and punitive damages to a
successful plaintiff than an individual ever would. However, outside of
a legislative amendment to the TVPA, the era of organizational liability
under the Act is over.
Additionally, questions will remain about the efficacy of aiding
and abetting liability itself, specifically against corporate actors. Indeed, logic tells us that the majority of extrajudicial killings and acts of
torture have no corporate involvement at all. And as the Eleventh Circuit commented in Drummond, properly pleading those that do may
be difficult under “heightened federal pleading standards.”228 Thus,
227. It would not be hard to imagine the Court to have said something to the effect
of: “While the TVPA considers liability beyond a torturer, this liability only extends to
those in the actor’s chain of command, and not to the entire world of people who may
have assisted the torture.” However, when addressing this issue, the Court merely says
that organizations could not be liable based on a theory of secondary liability and
makes no reference to secondary liability’s application in totality. Id.
228. Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 608 n.43 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Roger
P. Alford, The Future of Human Rights Litigation after Kiobel, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1749, 1756 (2014) (claiming that “pleading . . . a plausible occurrence” of corporate
executive aiding and abetting “will be extraordinarily difficult in light of heightened
federal pleading standards” (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009); and
then citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))).
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corporate-involved torture or killings that include sufficient evidence
needed to bring claims against corporate actors will be a “subset of a
subset.”
However, regardless of the limitations a given solution to maintain TVPA may have, it’s clear that the Act is one worth saving. The
lofty goals Congress articulated upon its passing, however unmet in
practice, were the correct ambitions. Providing those who have suffered grave physical, mental, and emotional harm a vehicle for achieving redress is a necessary endeavor. TVPA aiding and abetting liability,
specifically in the context of corporate-facilitated abuses, addresses
the holes created by the practical and jurisdictional problems, closing
the gap between culpable parties and TVPA-reachable defendants.
CONCLUSION
Congress had no intent to create a TVPA that was simply symbolic. But the milestone that was its enactment was permanently
threatened by the Supreme Court’s decision in Mohamad. As this Note
argues, utilizing aiding and abetting liability may be able to act as a
partial solution to the post-Mohamad toothless-ness of the Act. Aiding
and abetting gives TVPA plaintiffs a more realistic chance at solving
the practical and jurisdictional problems caused by Mohamad. These
claims also would help bring the United States a step closer to ensuring there is no “safe haven in the United States” for those who effect
human rights abuses.229 The use of aiding and abetting claims is both
consistent with the semi-ambiguous Supreme Court jurisprudence on
the subject generally and with supportive congressional statements in
the TVPA’s legislative history. Such liability also respects Mohamad, as
the Supreme Court made little reference to secondary liability claims
and the TVPA, and what reference it did make indicated an appetite
for such claims.

229. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (1991).

